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Chapter 1
How Social Simulation Could Help Social
Science Deal with Context
Bruce Edmonds
Abstract Much human cognition and behaviour is context-sensitive, but context
(especially social context) has largely not been explicitly represented or included in
theories of explanations of behaviour. Some of this is due to the fact that the word
“context” is over-used and so has a variety of subtly different meanings but more to
do with the perceived difficulties of dealing with context. Quantitative social science
has tended to ignore context, treating contextual variation as “noise”. Qualitative
social science has often almost deified context, resisting any attempts to generalise
from specific contexts. This paper suggests that agent-based modelling could play a
key role in dealing with context, representing it, understanding it and thus allowing
the well-founded integration of qualitative and quantitative evidence.
Keywords Context · Social science · Social simulation · Quantitative ·
Qualitative · Agent-based modelling
1.1 Introduction
That context is important for understanding social phenomena should be uncon-
troversial; yet dealing with it has been largely avoided. On one side, quantitative
social scientists tend to fit data that originates from a variety of contexts with a
single model (e.g. variants of linear regression) on the grounds that they are only
interested in generic patterns. At the other extreme, qualitative researchers interested
in rich (“thick”) descriptions of observations and experience take context seriously,
ensuring that they take care to describe relevant aspects of the context in what
they record and discuss but tend to resist any generalisations that cross contexts.
The point is that a crucial issue is not being explicitly addressed: that of context-
dependency itself.
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Let us start by making clear what everybody knows: people behave differently
in different kinds of situation that we can effectively recognise these kinds of
situation and use them to understand, and even predict, what people will do in
these situations. For example, we all recognise a lecture and know the social norms,
habits, conventions, roles, etc. that pertain there. If the lecture is declared finished
and coffee or wine served to celebrate something, the context has changed and
everybody will behave differently. To take another example, traders in a stock
market behave very differently during a bull and bear market (e.g. [11]). In a
bull market, it is relatively easy to make some money and traders might seek to
maximise their profits and endure quite high risk. In a bear market, traders are
in danger of losing their job, so it might be more important to not be the worst
performer in their group above all. In both cases, understanding behaviour is much
easier and more effective if you divide the case into the different contexts. To
produce models of behaviour that pertain to both lecture and celebration or to
both bear and bull markets involves a much more complex, ineffective and abstract
model. So why don’t quantitative social scientists pay any attention to this common
sense knowledge? Similarly, we all are able to recognise the difference between a
lecture and a celebration or traders between a bull and a bear market and, without
thinking about it much, apply the appropriate knowledge to each. So why don’t
some qualitative social scientists accept the usefulness of cautious generalisation
over particular situations?
This paper seeks to examine the difficulty of talking about and studying social
phenomena in a way that includes context but also suggests some ways forward
to do this. Firstly, there is some discussion of the different ways that the word
“context” is used, distinguishing between some different uses and trying to make
clear what I intend by the word. Then, the paper looks at and critiques some of
the ways that social science deals with (or avoids) the issue of context, looking at
the responses from quantitative and then qualitative approaches. Thirdly, it looks at
two ways in which agent-based social simulation could represent or be informed
by social context – via the use of context-sensitive cognitive models for agents and
by using the analysis of narrative data (including information about the relevant
social contexts) to help inform the specification of simulations. It ends with a plea
to change how we do social science.
1.2 Talking About “Context”
Before we can look at the issues, there are many potential confusions that can arise
from the term “context”. Thus I start by discussing this confusion and distinguishing
between some different uses – making connections between the different meanings
and trying to make my intent clear.
“Context” is a tricky word to use and a tricky phenomenon to pin down. Like
other notorious c-words (“complexity” and “creativity”), it is often used as a
“dustbin” concept – what one evokes when one’s normal explanation fails. It can
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also be used as a “flag” to indicate that the research is qualitative since context
is emphasised (almost deified) in the qualitative social sciences yet downplayed
(usually ignored completely) in the quantitative social sciences. Context, as a word,
is often used informally and hence has lots of subtly different usages, e.g. as
documented in Hayes [9]. Finally it is not clear that a particular context can be
reliably reified and talked about as thing at all. These difficulties may explain the
reluctance of researchers to engage with context, knowing it is a notoriously slippery
and difficult subject – I guess that many think it is better to avoid the swamp and
only play on firmer ground. However, with a little care, I argue that the idea and its
manifestations can be sensibly and usefully dealt with and the potential pay-off for
the social sciences could be considerable.
1.2.1 Situational Context
Firstly “the context” can refer to the situation one is in [3] – for them the exterior
situation is the context. This could be indicated by the exact coordinates and time;
however this is not a very helpful notion. The details that could be potentially
relevant to any series of events in any situation are indefinitely extensive. Rather
it is usual to abstract from specific situations to kinds of situation, for example,
going home on the train or shopping in a supermarket. The question “What was
the context?” implies that the speaker does not have enough information about the
situation some utterance or text comes from to understand it. The answer to such a
question would not be to specify the precise situation but to give enough information
about it to characterise the kind of situation one was in (e.g. “I was talking on the
phone to my mother”).
1.2.2 Cognitive Context
The fact that we can give enough information in a few words for the recipient to
be able to infer the right kind of situation indicates that such recognition is not
only feasible but also normal. It is well established that many aspects of human
cognition are highly context-dependent, including memory, preferences, language
use, language comprehension, decision-making, perception and reasoning [12, 16].
This implies that the brain has learned to reliably recognise these kinds of situation
and effectively the same kinds as others do. The cognitive correlate of the kind of
situation is called the “cognitive context” [9]1. Though most of us, as individuals,
do this unconsciously and with great facility (at least after childhood), we do not
1However “internal” factors such as emotion and current goals may also be inputs to determining
this.
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know how the brain does this, and it may be that it is very hard to replicate this
recognition explicitly2. However this ability allows for the following heuristics: to
learn knowledge with respect to the cognitive context currently being recognised
and give preferential access to that knowledge when the same cognitive context
occurs again. Thus when we enter a lecture, we do not have to “sift” through all the
social norms we have learned for the relevant one, but those relevant automatically
come to mind in that situation.
1.2.3 Social Context
Although cognitive context may be infeasible to determine in many cases, there
is one case where this may be much easier – that where the context has been
co-determined by many individuals in a society so that everybody recognises the
same kinds of situation. Examples include the lecture, a celebration, commuting
within a shared vehicle, religious ceremonies and an interview. Over time, specific
norms, habits, language, spaces, technologies and even clothing might have been
developed for that kind of situation, allowing the particular context to be easily
distinguished. Of course, the reverse also happens: the more easily a particular
context is distinguished, the more easily we will recognise it and develop specific
practices, technologies and methods of coordination for it. Thus, over time, some
contexts can become socially entrenched, acquire their own labels and be explicitly
talked about. For this reason, such “social contexts” are much easier to identify and
study than context in general.
Such social contexts can be very important since they allow for very different
systems for social coordination to be developed for different kinds of situation. For
example, how one coordinates behaviour on a fishing boat during periods of calm
might be very different from that when a storm is approaching. It is not just the
parameters of the coordination that change but the whole process.
Due to the difficulties involved in studying context, and a simple wish to avoid
the extra complexity that they imply, researchers have tended to, in effect, avoid
dealing with context head-on. A number of common research strategies have this
effect. These will now be discussed in turn.
1.3 How Social Science Deals with Context
Here I briefly review some of the ways in which social science currently deals with
(or avoids) context to motivate the need for the suggestions that follow in the next
section. This is by no means a comprehensive survey, since that would far too
2Thus it may not make sense to assume that “the context” can always be reified as a distinct object
that can be referred to, though as we argue it sometimes can be.
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lengthy, but I hope this is sufficient to make the huge lacuna real for the reader.
It includes two major approaches/assumptions made in quantitative social science
and a critique of how some qualitative social science avoids the problem of context-
dependency by leaving any cross-context generalisation implicit.
1.3.1 Quantitative Social Science
1.3.1.1 Context-Dependency and Randomness
For those researchers who claim to be “only interested in what behaviour is generic”,
they may choose a model and “fit” it to some data, to see how good a fit it is (or
whether it has a better fit than an alternative model). The variation not captured
by the models is then attributed to “noise”, which is usually represented as some
kind of randomness (sometimes this is indicated by the presence of an “error” term
in equations). Typically the same, relatively simple model is fitted to the whole
available data set and the extent that it “explains” the data – the likelihood that this
fit is not by chance assessed (the so-called significance tests). In the social sciences,
these are often variants of linear correlation models, though others variants also
exist, such as the use of the “POMDP” class of models [10] in natural language
processing.
The problem with this approach is that the generalisation could be occurring
over different kinds of situation where different kinds of strategies might be being
exhibited. The generic model “averages” over these different kinds of behaviour –
producing a composite behaviour that might have elements of all of them, but misses
some of the essential structural information about the observed.
A simple abstract example can illustrate this problem. Say there are two kinds
of situation that occur within a sample of data: type A and type B. Within type
A, variable a is strongly correlated with outcome x, and variable b is weakly anti-
correlated with outcome y. Within type B, the opposite occurs: variable a is weakly
anti-correlated with outcome x, and variable b is strongly correlated with outcome
y. If types A and B occurred with roughly equal frequency, a generic correlation
model relating a and b to x and y fitted to the complete data set might come to
the conclusion that a is weakly correlated with x and b is weakly correlated with
y for the whole domain at a significant level. This is illustrated below in Fig. 1.1.
In this way, a lot of valuable information has been lost compared to a composite
model that fitted separate models for each type. Comparing the generic model to
the composite model, one would find that the generic model is not as strong and
it misses the fact that there are parts of the data (from a specific kind of situation)
with anti-correlations. Even an approach which included a variable to say whether a
point belonged to type A or B would not help unless it was able to “switch” off and
on the appropriate parts of the generic model.
If one imagines fitting a generic model over a great many kinds of situation,
the expected result would be that many variables would be correlated with many
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Fig. 1.1 An illustration of
averaging out context-specific
trends into a generic model
others at a significant level but only explaining a relatively small level of the total
variation. This is, indeed, the result of many exercises in social science that apply
generic models to data that may cover many different kinds of situation.
Not only has a lot of information been lost, but any policy based on such an
analysis might be ineffective or even counter-productive for sub-groups of the
population. Consider the case where there were twice as many of type A than of
type B; then a generic correlation model fitted to the data might be that variable
a is weakly correlated with x but there is no overall correlation of b with y. If the
objective of policy is to increase x and y, then the inferred strategy would be to
increase a only – despite the fact that this would have the contrary impact in a third
of the cases. It seems obvious that if there were a technique to detect that there were
essentially two different groups and to determine what model of behaviour fitted
each, this might allow for a finer-grained understanding of data that might allow
the more effective targeting of policy. Of course if it turned out that there was a
substantial commonality between the separate models inferred, it might make sense
to combine them into a generic model.
1.3.1.2 Over-generic Cognitive Models
Many of those that produce models based upon some kind of micro-specification
simply assume that there is some generic model of behaviour that is valid across
different contexts. The idea seems to be that there must be some generic cognitive
model, albeit complex, that changes when the input to that agent or unit changes.
I call the assumption that there must be a generic underlying model “behavioural
foundationalism”.
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For example, neo-classical decision theory reduces all decisions between choices
to a single model: that of a utility comparison on the consequences of decisions.
More complex or social decisions are implemented by a more complex utility
function. However, such an approach excludes any examination of the process
by which decisions might be made3, which might well be different in different
circumstances – processes that might have very different collective outcomes from
each other. For example, even if a process of individual consideration of the options
and a social one (maybe looking what others are doing and imitating those who are
most successful) might have a similar individual outcome for that individual, they
might have very different collective outcomes. If many are following the imitative
strategy, then there will be spreading waves of innovation. Another example of
where the only behaviour modelled is that of social norms (e.g. [7])4. On a more
mundane level, most of the cognitive algorithms within social simulations tend to
be fairly simple and include no context-dependency at all, so in a way these all
build in the assumption that a single simple algorithm will be sufficient to cover the
different circumstances the agents face.
Whilst it is true that in some ultimate, biological sense, humans do have roughly
the same equipment for making decisions – the nervous system – it is also true that
this equipment takes years of external input, training, before it is very useful for
making decisions. This suggests that a generic model of decision-making would
have to be similarly complex and able to learn different strategies for different kinds
of situation. There is ample evidence that many aspects of human cognition are
context-dependent, including memory, decision-making, language, preferences and
perception [12, 16]. One suspects that neo-classical economists simply hoped that
they could produce physics-like models and thus bypass the complex and messy
ways people actually make decisions, enabling them to find a shortcut that dealt with
analytically modellable processes. However it has not had good empirical success.
There are now so many exceptions to the received pattern of economic rationality
that we should start to question whether this is the right starting point or whether
this dogma might be better ditched.
It needs to be pointed out that many doing agent-based simulations are just as
guilty of assuming a simple generic model of behaviour as neo-classical economists.
Again this seems to be justified by an assumption that a more abstract model will
be more general5. This is no more than a convenient hope. Whilst it might well be
true that adding empirically based detail into a model might make it less general,
the reverse does not work – simplifying away detail does not mean one achieves
greater generality. The reason for this is clear – when simplifying, one does not
know a priori what detail can be safely abstracted away. If one removes something
essential to the phenomena being studied, then the result is a model that does not
3Simon’s [15] distinction between procedural and substantive rationality
4Even social norms work in a complex and context-sensitive way [20].
5Although one suspects that often the reasons are more based on the mundane constraints of time
and complication.
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work for any observed cases, i.e. with no generality at all. Imagine abstracting away
the variables from a linear model and just leaving the constant; this has not resulted
in a more general model but one that is true almost nowhere.
A problem here is that an abstract model may often seem to be potentially
applicable to a wide range of cases, but not in a precise manner. Here the model
is used as a kind of analogy – that is, what the model parts refer to is not precisely
defined but is left to each interpreter to construct “on the fly” – each person will
interpret it in a different way. This is in contrast to a model where its relationship
to what we might observe (represented by data of some kind) is well defined.
Analogies provide very useful ways of thinking about a situation but do not give
reliable or testable knowledge. Their success as an analogy does not give any
guarantees that a more concrete version will be able to establish a more direct
relationship with anything observable – developing an analogical model does not
necessarily lead to an empirically validated one. In particular, a more abstract model
of behaviour that appears to have general applicability (because it is used as an
analogy) may well turn out to have less scope than one that is specific to a particular
kind of situation in an empirically precise manner.
It may turn out that some elements of our behaviour can be understood in a
generic manner, independent of the context, but this is something that needs to be
demonstrated rather than assumed because it makes our job (as researchers) easier.
1.3.2 Qualitative Social Science
In contrast to the above approaches, many qualitative approaches pay a lot of
attention to context – this is often described and included in their accounts and is by
no means an afterthought or avoided. Indeed context is often deemed so important in
these studies, that any possibility of generalisation to a different context is avoided –
each context is unique. Thus one might have some high-quality observational or
ethnographic work describing individual behaviour and strategies within a specific
context but without any indication as to what could be learnt from this that might be
useful elsewhere6 – generalisation is often left to the reader here.
This is a highly defensible stance since generalisations are risky and open to
criticism by others. By keeping to discussion of phenomena only within specific
contexts, one can counter any objection with regard to the unique circumstances
within the observed contexts – contexts that the presenting researcher has unique
6The exception is negative knowledge – counter examples to established assumptions – but this
leads to the conclusion that we know nothing except specifics.
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access to7. Here we have to opposite problem to overgeneralisation, to a situation
where almost nothing is generalised at all8.
In order for any knowledge to be useful, one needs to have some idea as to
when it is applicable. Thus although detailed qualitative observations can expand
our ideas of what people do in different situations – the possibilities – to be useful,
we also need to know something about to what kinds of situation we can apply this
knowledge.
1.4 Some Ways Agent-Based Social Simulation Could Deal
with Context
Despite the difficulty of the subject and the corresponding circumvention in much
social science, there are a number of approaches whereby we might at least start to
touch upon context within social phenomena. These include using machine learning
algorithms to attempt to infer context from suitably rich and extensive data [4,
17] and context-sensitive visualisation approaches, staging modelling to make the
scope of sub-models clearer and extending qualitative elicitation techniques to better
clarify implicit indications of context. However, here I only concentrate on two
approaches which involve social simulation.
1.4.1 Implementing Context-Sensitive Agents in Social
Simulations
Whilst it is very hard to include context-dependency within analytically solvable
models, there is no reason why this needs to be the case with agent-based simulation
models. However this does require a bit more “cognitive” machinery. Instead of
each agent having a fixed resource of knowledge or behavioural rules, it needs
to have different pools of such resources that can be selected depending on the
context. In other words, the memory of the agent needs to be context-sensitive,
so that context-relevant knowledge and behaviours can be preferentially applied
in decision-making. Although this requires some technical changes, this is quite
possible to do, ending up with an architecture as illustrated in Fig. 1.2. This sort
7Even if others have observed the same general kind of situation, it can always be claimed that this
was at a different time or involved different actors with different goals – the defensive strategy that
says every context is unique.
8To be precise, specific observations might be accompanied by imprecise and analogical discus-
sion, but this is also immune to being wrong (except in maybe missing out a favorite dimension of
a reader) due to its informality. Also it does not help in the identification of context or any other









Fig. 1.2 The basic context-sensitive architecture for agents
of architecture also has major advantages in terms of the feasibility of learning or
reasoning, since each of these is restricted to the relevant set of knowledge for that
context. It also allows a well-structured integration between context recognition
(which may leverage “fuzzy” machine learning techniques) with reasoning and
belief update algorithms (which tend to be crisp and derived more from the field
of artificial intelligence).
However such an architecture does impose an extra burden in terms of specifying
a lot more knowledge and/or behaviours for the agents for all the relevant contexts.
In the simplest case, where one knows what the relevant contexts are and how to
recognise them, then the different behaviours can be simply programmed into the
agent, along with how to recognise each context, e.g. the approach of the CYC
project [13]. Of course, one does not need a specialised architecture to do this – one
could just program in more complex rules – but a specialised context-dependent
memory might facilitate the process and its checking. In the more complex case,
one may not know all the relevant contexts, in which case the agents might need to
induce these themselves. This is more complex but possible [6, 8, 19].
Since the behavioural rules at the micro-level of agent-based simulation can be
quite specific, I suspect there are quite a few existing agent-based models that have
taken some aspects of context-dependency into account without necessarily calling
it context-sensitive (e.g. [1, 2, 14]). Each agent in such simulations does detect the
kind of situation it is in, and so it will behave differently in different situations.
However, these do not distinguish context from other inputs that might influence
behaviour and hence do not distinguish what can and cannot be shared between
what kinds of situation.
1.4.2 Approaching Context from Qualitative Narratives
One source of information about context that could be exploited to inform the design
of social simulations is that of qualitative evidence – that is, the text of observational
or ethnographic work or those deriving from the relevant subjects (e.g. in interviews
or their online posts). However, such evidence is often treated with suspicion by
those who want to be seen to be doing “science”. Thus I start this section with a
little discussion as to why qualitative research could inform simulation as well as
sketching how this might work to a limited degree.
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A fundamental value of science is that evidence “trumps” theory, in the sense
that if evidence and theory clash then, generally, it is the theory that should be either
discarded or modified. One corollary of this is that evidence should not be ignored
without a very, very good reason. Thus neither qualitative nor quantitative evidence
should be ignored. Of course, one should judge the significance of data with respect
to its nature and how it was derived, for example, in terms of its relevance, reliability,
subject dependence, precision, biases due to observation procedure, distortions in
the process of derivation and communication and context-dependency. The quality
of data is thus judged in a multitude of ways – different sets of data having different
characteristics. Thus qualitative evidence might have a high degree of relevance and
precision concerning events that occurred but be subject to different interpretations.
Quantitative data is not necessarily more reliable just because it is expressed in a
formal, precise form, but it may be if the process by which it is derived is carefully
controlled and well founded.
Neo-classical economics has been notorious for ignoring a lot of evidence as to
how people make economic decisions. Often this is done via an “as if” argument,
which can be roughly expressed as follows: “we know people do not act in this
way, but en masse we can treat them as if they do”. In the last couple of decades,
experiments have shown that people do not act as if the theory of neo-classical
economic decision-making would suggest, e.g. due to different frames of reference
[18] or in-group bias [21].
One problem about using qualitative evidence is that it has been difficult to use
qualitative data in conjunction with formal modelling methods. However agent-
based modelling is well placed to use qualitative evidence to inform the menu of
behavioural strategies that people might use in different situations. There is now
a growing stream of work on methods to improve the process of the analysis of
textual narrative data into behavioural rules (suitable for an agent in an agent-
based simulation) – that is, make this more transparent and systematised [5]. Once
these behaviours have been incorporated into a simulation at the micro-level, the
simulation can be run and then measured to produce numbers that can be compared
to macro-level quantitative data [22]. The agent-based simulation can be inspected
and experimented upon to understand the process by which this occurs, and the
coherence of the qualitative assumptions and the quantitative evidence investigated.
Furthermore, a careful analysis of narrative data can suggest some of the context-
dependency of behaviour, and if the agents in the model have a context-dependent
architecture (as discussed above), this can be incorporated in a systematic manner
into the model (Fig. 1.3).
Thus explicitly recognising and including context-dependency in formal simu-
lation models can facilitate the integration of qualitative, quantitative and formal
modelling approaches in the social sciences. In this way, some of the wealth of
qualitative ethnographic, observational and interviewing work that is done in the
social sciences can be used to enrich formal simulation models directly, and it does
so in a way that allows the quantitative and the qualitative to be assessed together
and against each other. The complexity of social phenomena will require all our
resources to unpick and understand – facing context-dependency can aid the use of
a wider range of evidence without abandoning rigour.
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Fig. 1.3 An example (from
[5]) of a process of narrative
analysis separately
identifying context, scope and
narrative elements
1.5 Concluding Discussion
Before the advent of cheap computing power, analytic mathematical models were
the only formal models available. Solving them or computing answers from them
was onerous, so that only simple models were feasible. Their simplicity effectively
ruled out context-dependency, leading to a focus on what generic models might
tell us. Some of those who appreciated the complexity and context-dependency of
social phenomena understandably reacted to this oversimplification and went to the
opposite extreme, almost deifying context.
Now that we have cheap computing power, none of this is necessary. We no
longer have to distort the phenomena we study in order to achieve useful formal
models – we are now free to choose the most appropriate kind of formal model –
which may well be a computational model such as an agent-based simulation. Cheap
computational devices have also resulted in there being a lot more data around about
social phenomena – official and informal. We are starting to have enough data to
distinguish the different contexts and their associated behaviours – we no longer
have to fit generic models to it due to data paucity and limits to the complexity of
what we can store/manipulate. Now it is relatively easy to capture, retain, process
and compare such data. Finally, we can start to use qualitative and formal methods
together – enriching each other. There is no longer any need to ignore context or
oversimplify what we observe to obtain and use formal models.
This has been a long time coming, since the old habits derived from a pre-
computational age die slowly. However, the age of context-dependent modelling
and manipulation is now within our reach. We now longer have to avoid it and hope
for the best but can start to grapple with its complexity and so make better use of
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our data (throwing less of it away as noise) and knowledge (bringing more of it to
bear down on problems in an more integrated manner). It has the potential for more
meaningful, more accurate and more useful models of social phenomena. It will
seem odd to future generations that we have been so slow to do this.
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